Servers in country
Providers with exit locations in Guyana: a server here gives you an address in the country. The register’s table records no mandate for VPN operators here; the briefing below sets out what the law asks of providers.
Only a few providers publish an exit here.
Providers with exit locations in a country — a fact about a network, kept deliberately apart from where the company is registered. Only providers whose country list has a source appear: a provider that publishes nothing simply does not show up, which is a criterion already in the data rather than an editorial one.
Under Guyana’s Interception of Communications Act 2008, interception needs a judge’s warrant, though a designated officer may act without one in a national emergency or where urgency makes a warrant impracticable, and a 2019 amendment added further exceptions. The Cybercrime Act 2018 also obliges every service provider to store subscribers’ traffic data for ninety days, which a judge may extend to a year in a particular case.
Section 25 of the Cybercrime Act 2018 (Act No. 16 of 2018) requires a service provider to store subscribers’ traffic data for ninety days from the day a computer system generates it. A judge may order storage for longer, up to one year, on an ex parte application by a police officer of Superintendent rank or above, case by case.
Subscriber information must be kept from the start of the service and for ninety days after the agreement ends. Failure to comply is an offence carrying a fine of three million dollars and one year’s imprisonment. The Act defines a service provider as any public or private entity that lets users communicate by means of a computer system, or that processes or stores electronic data for such a service or its users (section 2).
A judge may order a service provider in Guyana to produce traffic data or subscriber information (section 31). Whether a VPN operator is a service provider under these sections is not established. In September 2024 the Attorney General announced a review of the Act, to address among other things the courts’ jurisdiction over cybercrime matters and who may serve documents.
Section 18 of the Act punishes intentionally publishing, transmitting or circulating by computer system a statement or other material that advocates the use of force, without authority of law, to change the government; incites treason or any offence against the President or a member of the Government; encourages joining a terrorist group or committing terrorist financing; or excites ethnic divisions or hostility against any class of persons on the ground of race.
The penalty is five years’ imprisonment on conviction on indictment. Section 18(4) provides that expressing disapprobation of the Government’s measures or administrative action, or pointing out errors or defects of the Government, Constitution or Parliament, is not an offence under the section.
Section 19 covers using a computer system to publish or transmit data that intimidates a person or threatens violence in order to compel an act or omission; to publish indecent or obscene data, or send it repeatedly, to humiliate or harass; and to disseminate information known to be false that damages a person’s reputation or subjects them to public ridicule, contempt, hatred or embarrassment.
Threatening to publish private information to extort a benefit is also an offence. Each is punished on summary conviction by a fine of five million dollars and three years’ imprisonment, or on indictment by ten million dollars and five years. An account is traced through the provider: a judge may order production of subscriber information or traffic data (section 31), and section 25 requires that data to be stored.
The Interception of Communications Act 2008 (Act No. 21 of 2008) makes intentional interception of a communication in transmission an offence, with a fine up to five million dollars and three years’ imprisonment, unless it is done under a judge’s warrant or on the authority of a designated officer in a national emergency or where seeking a warrant is impracticable given the urgency (section 3).
A judge may issue a warrant only if it is necessary in the interests of national security or to prevent or detect a scheduled offence, other investigative procedures have failed or are impracticable, and it serves the administration of justice. A warrant runs for up to ninety days and may be renewed for up to ninety days, then again for exceptional circumstances.
A 2019 amendment to the Act, passed in May 2019, added further exceptions to the offence; the Government’s information department reports that they include interception where there are reasonable grounds for believing that a party to the communication consents. The Cybercrime Act likewise routes extended storage, production and preservation orders through a judge. The order of the rows is the security score, and a server’s location is not a recommendation.
Guyana
Only a provider that publishes a country list appears here at all — 41 of the 77 on file. The other 27 are not missing research: they publish no list, and U02_server_countries is unknown for them rather than filled from the number their marketing claims.
A provider that says “100+ countries” and enumerates none gets no page on any of them, and the count printed on its own record is the length of the list, never the claim. With 41 providers behind 180 countries, the long tail of these pages carries one or two rows.
More countries
What moved
Every row is the record’s own history[], filtered to U02_server_countries and P04_mandate_response; the whole log holds every field.
29 Aug 20261 changes
NordVPNResponse to a national logging mandateP04_mandate_response
not on the record changed to withdrew_physical
Coverage149countries
Paying monthly$14.99monthly
Paying yearly$139.08yearly total
Free tierNopaid plans only
Devices10at once
Security
Usability
Coverage168countries
Paying monthly$11.99monthly
Paying yearly$47.84yearly total
Free tierYeslimited free plan
Devices5at once
Security
Usability