Weak

IVPN

Commercial VPNGibraltarRank 3 of 68

Paying monthly

$6.00 per month

Paying yearly

$60.00 billed once a year

Coverage

41 countries with an exit

Free tier

No paid plans only

38 out of 100

Security

66 out of 100

Usability

Visit site

Service class

Commercial VPN — security leads

Security score

38 of 100 · Weak

Usability score

66 of 100 · state known · 100% established · 100.0% of the weight read

Legal entity

IVPN Limited, 5 Secretary's lane, GX11 1AA, Gibraltar

Jurisdiction

Gibraltar

Ultimate owner

Nicholas Pestell, founder and CEO, 100% owner of IVPN Limited

Exposure

Medium · dominant channel: retention

Retention

Nothing that links traffic to a person

Latest audit

Cure53 · 8 Apr 2024 · An annual series · Yes, and the report was read

Countries with exits

Protocols

WireGuard OpenVPN IKEv2 An obfuscated protocol

Works under active censorship

Claimed to work

Weakest protocol still offered

not applicable

Own DNS inside the tunnel

Yes, on the provider's word

Platforms

Windows macOS Linux iOS Android Routers

Simultaneous devices

Kill switch

On every platform

Split tunnelling

Available

Signing up

No account needed

Free tier

No free tier

P2P allowed

Allowed on some servers

Major streaming services reachable

Some services reachable

Price, monthly

$6.00 per month

Price, yearly

$60.00 a year at renewal, billed once

Offered countries that sit under a logging mandateC09_mandate_countries

Country of the ultimate beneficial ownerM11_owner_jurisdiction

unknown

Owner group cluster keyM15_owner_group

independent

Date the current owner took controlM16_control_since

not applicable

Role of this brand inside the groupM17_brand_role

principal

Infrastructure shared with cluster siblingsM18_shared_infrastructure

separate

Total published auditsV10_audit_count

Where the security score comes from

Eight channels, each asking one question of the published record and reading a named set of fields to answer it. They multiply rather than add — the factor beside a channel is what is left after the pressure it found, and open a channel to see every field it read, as it is stored. How the model works

Security fields

67 55 of them feed a channel

Established

54 7 left unknown, 6 not applicable

Completeness

89% the share the model could weigh

Citations

93 across 25 documents

Every value carries what it rests on, and the model weighs the four levels differently. Weight, then how many citations on this record sit at that level:

A weighs 1.00 · 14 hereB weighs 0.85 · 70 hereC weighs 0.70 · 9 here

The weights are methodology.json’s own; a claim seen in the artefact itself counts for more than the same claim reported second-hand. The date at the end of a row is the day that value was last read.

A channel does not price every field it reads. The ones it did are marked along their edge and carry what they added; everything else was read and cost nothing. Only a channel that composes field by field can mark a field at all — the rest price themselves by the parameters printed above their rows.

Still open on this record.

One no-logs audit, in 2019. IVPN is unusually explicit about what it does not do: its own post states that its last and only no-logs audit was Cure53 in March 2019, and that it has deliberately not repeated the format because such a stamp describes one day and not the days after it.

What the claim rests on now. Every audit since targets apps and services, so the no-logs claim on the infrastructure rests on the March 2019 engagement and on the February 2023 gateway review, not on anything recent.

The audit not yet published. The eighth annual Cure53 audit was scheduled for July 2026 and no report for 2025 or 2026 is published yet, which is why the latest report date is the April 2024 one.

the rest of what is open — 348 more words

The August 2026 incident. In August 2026 an attacker exploited a vulnerability in the self-hosted BTCPay Server, before it was public, and took IVPN's own Lightning operating funds. IVPN published the account four days later, unprompted, and scoped it to that machine: the VPN gateways were not involved, no customer records were reached, no customer money was lost.

Why it costs nothing. The model charges nothing for this, which is the point — an operator that says so promptly is behaving the way the field is meant to reward, and the entry is here so a reader knows it happened rather than to move a number.

What the engagements covered. The app pentest (iOS, Android, Electron, the daemon) is from March 2022 and the gateway/server-OS review from February 2023; neither tested the no-logs claim itself, the 2023 report says so explicitly, so retention rests on the privacy policy declaration alone.

The latest report is not the relevant one. April 2024's engagement, Cure53's sixth with IVPN, tested the customer account website, API and hosting; its own scope page names client apps and VPN servers out of scope, so it extends neither the app nor the gateway evidence, and V03_audit_subject reads unknown for it rather than carrying that credit forward. The seventh engagement, on the new email and DNS services, was only announced for May 2025; no report for it is published.

What the primary site never establishes. RAM-only is recorded as partial because IVPN describes it as a transition with test deployments under way, and has not announced its completion. Server hardware ownership (leased vs owned), traffic modification at the exit, and the beneficial owner's personal jurisdiction are unestablished: no primary IVPN page states any of the three, nor does user-base scale.

Three fields the knowledgebase answers, not the pages read at first fill. IP allocation is shared by design — "crowding" pools users on one address to blunt attribution. P2P is allowed everywhere, but IVPN asks customers to avoid US exits, citing upstream DMCA pressure. Streaming carries no guarantee, though the company says many customers do reach it.

On the record as a whole.

First fill 2026-08-26. Sourced entirely from ivpn.net's own pages, the Cure53 audit PDFs and IVPN's blog — no affiliate or review-aggregator site cited.

RetentionDoes a record exist that links traffic to a person, and who checked?13 fields read · 1 left unknown · 2 not applicable · 52.6 points of pressure×0.474

Composed rather than added: a prior of 0.55 on the silent branch, moved by what the paper says (0.046) and by what the practice shows (0.0), at credence 0.046 from the audit and 0.855 from how the provider engaged, against a severity of 0.03 for what is actually retained.

Retention linkable to a person as declaredmaterialC01_linkable_retention

none_linkable

Bivpn.net26 Aug 2026

Report a problem with C01_linkable_retention

Persistent device identifier the provider holdsC12_device_identifier

app_scoped_id

Bivpn.net26 Aug 2026

Report a problem with C12_device_identifier

At least one independent auditmaterialV01_audit_exists

yes_verified

Acure53.de Acure53.de

Computed

×0.384 of a clean record completeness 89%

Where the drop comes from: Retention. It is the channel this record's risk is concentrated in — on its own it takes a clean record to ×0.474, and its bar above is filled to that.

Exposure is recorded as medium and the integrity status as clean.

This record sits above the register's average on all 8 channels. The narrowest margin is Disclosure, ×1.000 against ×0.970.

Published score

Every row above is one field of the published record, and every one of them can be challenged: every row carries Report, or raise something about the record as a whole. A correction with a source behind it is made the same day, and if it moves the score it moves the rank.

Specification

Carried, never scored

Countries with an exit

What changed

If this one is not right

Compared with

IVPN

Proton VPN

Mullvad VPN

AirVPN

Where the security score comes from