Mullvad VPN vs NordVPN

The 2018 Finland datacenter breach was a third-party intrusion, not a law-enforcement seizure — recorded under P12_case_history as kind=breach, not P01_seizure_event. NordVPN's own account (nordvpn.com/blog/official-response-datacenter-breach/) and Bloomberg's contemporaneous coverage agree the disclosure followed Twitter allegations by outside researchers, not NordVPN's own initiative — hence third_party_disclosed rather than self_disclosed_late.

NordVPN and Surfshark share a parent (Nord Security) but both companies' own merger announcement states separate infrastructure and product roadmaps; M18 is set to separate on that basis.

Why the count reads eight. The audit count is eight because the GotaTun review sits outside the app repository's own list. Before them, a 30 person-day X41 D-Sec review across all five platforms found six vulnerabilities — three high, two medium, one low, none critical.

What no engagement covers. What none of these engagements covers is the server fleet: every one of them examines the app or the tunnel protocol, which is why fleet coverage is recorded as not applicable rather than as a sample. The no-logs claim on the infrastructure side therefore rests on the April 2023 search warrant — Swedish police came for customer data and left without it — and not on any audit.

Reproducible builds, Android only. Reproducible builds are Android-only, from version 2025.2 onward, so the field stays partial; the desktop and iOS builds are not verifiable bit-for-bit. Turkey is the one mandate country on the offered list and the hosting behind it is not established.

Nothing published about demands. Nothing on record rests on anything the provider publishes about demands it receives: there is no transparency report and no warrant canary, so the April 2023 seizure carries that ground alone. Kill-switch coverage and P2P policy are unestablished; the latest audit is a protocol code review, not a no-logs engagement, so V11 is silent and retention leans on the declaration.

The canary, and the quarter that replaced it. The same page retired the warrant canary (P07=removed) for quarterly transparency reports; the latest complete quarter (Apr–Jun 2026) shows 85 government inquiries and 0 disclosures, so P08/P09 are that period, not the lifetime figure.

India, and the secret-order regime. P04=withdrew_physical is the June 2022 India exit. P11=none_known rests on the page's statement that NordVPN has received no binding National Security letters or gag orders and on Panama's absence of such a regime.

An assurance level nobody can check. NordVPN describes the Deloitte Lithuania engagement as a reasonable assurance engagement under ISAE 3000 (Revised), which would be the stronger form; PIA's report, which can be read, states a limited assurance conclusion.

Why the stronger form is not credited. The model now prices that difference, and this record does not get the benefit of it: V15_assurance_strength is unknown because the only statement of the level is NordVPN's own, about a report nobody outside a Nord Account can open. A document behind a login is not evidence here at any level, so the engagement is credited at the market norm rather than at the level it is said to have reached.

A report behind a login. The report itself is readable only after signing in to a Nord Account, so nobody outside that relationship has checked its scope, and every audit field here rests on NordVPN's own summary of it rather than on the document. That, and not a finding against the service, is why this record is the thinnest in the catalogue.

The owner fields. M11_owner_jurisdiction and X04_owner_group_history are unknown: nordvpn.com and nordsecurity.com name Nord Security as owner but neither states Nord Security's own jurisdiction of incorporation or any prior record for the group; secondary press ties a 'Cyberspace' holding entity to the Netherlands from the 2022 merger, but that was not confirmed against a primary Nord Security or NordVPN page in the time available.

What could not be read at all. The full text of the 2025 Deloitte report cannot be read at all (login-gated), so no retention finding is recorded beyond the policy's own claim in C01_linkable_retention.

The server table that would not open. C09b_mandate_hosting is unknown: the live per-country server table shows physical/virtual status only for the Americas region in the accordion state this audit could render; Europe, Asia-Pacific and Africa/Middle East sections (which include several mandate countries the fleet serves, e.g. AE, IN, TR, VN, IQ, KZ per the servers API) load client-side on click and were not expanded.